

4 Polit. Pamph. vol 44<sup>9</sup>.

**POLITICAL REVERIES,  
AND  
UTOPIAN SCHEMES**

FOR THE WELFARE OF  
GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

[PRICE ONE SHILLING AND SIX-PENCE.]

1800 11 10

K

1800 11 10

K



# POLITICAL REVERIES,

AND

# UTOPIAN SCHEMES

FOR THE WELFARE OF

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

BY AN

I D L E M A N.

WITH

A P L A N

FOR NEW MODELLING THE

B R I T I S H F O R C E S

BY

S E A A N D L A N D.

IMMEDIABILE VULNUS ENSE RECIDENDUM.

L O N D O N:

PRINTED BY AND FOR W. RICHARDSON, STRAND.

M D C C LXXX.



[ 2 ]

~~it is difficult to say how far I  
can venture in my judgment, but it is not  
safe to trust the opinions of honest  
men, and I consider a book very  
valuable when it is written by  
a man of sense and virtue.~~

## POLITICAL REVERIES, &c.

~~and you will be well advised to  
read it with care, as it will be of great  
service to you in your political  
studies.~~

Bruxelles, 1780.

My dear Sir,

**I**N consequence of the several conversations we have had together, concerning the military and marine forces of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the advantages the House of Bourbon derive, and must have over us in the beginning of a war; I have seriously considered the subject, viz. by what means we may place ourselves on an equality without changing our form of government, or submitting ourselves to the same despotic power their subjects groan under.

A

I AM

I AM well aware how impossible it is for a person not bred up to a military profession, to enter into all the details necessary upon such a subject. I see plainly likewise that my plan is liable to many errors, and will meet with numberless objections ; nevertheless, if any good whatsoever to my country can arise from these hints, I shall be truly happy. Do you sift the corn from the chaff, and afterwards make whatever use you please of my leisure hours : situated as I most unfortunately am, my time is nothing. I am infinitely obliged to those who furnish me with new books, or new thoughts ; and of course ought to return you ten thousand thanks for having drawn away my attention from more melancholy reflections, and turned my ideas towards the resources and weaknesses of my country : however unwilling to engage in such an undertaking, I have committed my thoughts to paper, and send them to you for your perusal and opinion.

BEFORE

BEFORE I proceed to shew how necessary it is to new model the army and marine service, in order to prevent the misfortunes we are always liable to at the breaking out of a war with France ; and which we were nearly incurring the spring of the year 1778 (as you well know) ; I must recal to your mind our situation as an island ; the greatness of our naval power, by which we have risen gradually to that pitch of glory we had attained before the peace of Paris ; the alliances we had in Europe, by which the strength of France was divided, and her attention to her marine diverted into other channels : the fatal consequences attending that peace, and in having departed from the old systems, which had made the country flourish for so many years. I will next beg of you to reflect how absolutely incumbent a real and extensive plan of œconomy is to a nation, like ours, groaning under such a load of debt and taxes ; and how much the reverse our military establishment is in every part of it, as well as improper for our island's situation.

And lastly, turn your thoughts to our resources, the true political system that ought to be adopted by an island, and the means by which we can hope to regain and maintain our lost empire of the sea; without which we shall become dependent upon the will of the House of Bourbon.

I WILL not enter fully into each article, it would be endless; I will confine myself to the subject-matter of our conversations in this place. I mention them merely as preparatory to my Utopian plan, without which it may not strike so forcibly, nor will the necessity of a great change in our military departments be acknowledged by the many, for whose welfare and happiness it is designed.

My fundamental principle is, that an island ought to have no continental establishments whatsoever, and little connection with the continental powers of Europe, except when our quota is always stipulated to be in money, and in that support

port which our fleets can give: such alliances would be of infinite use; but whatever tends to drain us of men, and to divert our strength from our navy, is false policy, and must sooner or later end in our ruin.

OUR colonies should consist only of islands, which may be easily controuled by our fleets, and more especially if we had a settlement of arms, artillery, &c. in some healthy spot, at a less distance from them than the mother-country is, in order that no time might be lost in quelling the first embers of a rebellion.

IF a great continent, such as America, is unanimous and determined to resist, the distance alone from Great Britain is sufficient to destroy all the efforts of even a much greater power than ours. It must be attended with an enormous expence, a great loss of men, and in the end prove fruitless. For even if we had succeeded to our wishes, there would have been no possibility of retaining in perfect obedience such a vast continent, swarming with inhabitants

inhabitants in most parts, but by such a continual drain of men and money ; that must have ruined us ultimately ; or we must have pursued the old Roman method of destroying one half of the great body of the people, in order to rule over the remaining debilitated race of slaves, from whom no essential benefit could have been derived to our commerce, on the flourishing of which alone our empire depends. The only true policy of governing colonies at a great distance is by the leniency of our laws, and incorporating them with ourselves, by the enjoyments of the rights belonging to a free people. This method might have induced them to consider themselves as part of the British empire, united by the same ties, the same principles, as well as the same blood ; but when the essential foundations are broken through, and what is law and right in one part of the world, is of no effect in another part, it is natural for men to resist, to consider themselves as unjustly treated, and that all the ties which had bound them together were dissolved ;

dissolved; perhaps some people may observe in this place, and say, Would you have your colonies enjoy every right that the mother country doth? My answer is short, No! I think their trade should be controuled in all things where it might injure us; but in other respects her commerce should be free. It is but just that in return for our fostering and defence of them, that they should submit to this controul on our part; they should likewise pay all the expences required by us for the support and maintenance of their own governments; but it should be by a requisition on our part, and the mode and manner of raising it should be left to their assemblies.

IT was absurd to expect that a great nation, consisting of three millions of people, many descended from those who had quitted England to preserve their liberties, would ever submit to claims so injurious to the rights of mankind, and so contrary to the spirit of the constitution of Great Britain, to which they had ever

looked up with reverence. It was narrow policy that led us to this foolish step, and it was impracticable to be executed from the nature of the country, and the distance of it from us. The methods adopted to controul them were unwise in every respect, as it destroyed and perverted the efforts of our navy, and enriched them by the numerous land forces we transported there. I scarce know how to avoid saying something, and yet I fear to say too much; to probe the wound to the bottom would be a tedious work. History is full of numberless examples of failure in similar cases, even where the resistance was nearer at hand to the seat of empire; but all the information received by ministers was false, and they credulously believed that which they wished to be true, without letting their reason operate, or duly considering the greatness of the undertaking: they seem to have been totally ignorant of the force, disposition, and resources of America; they appear not to have consulted and advised with those officers who had served longest in America, or else

else to have been most strangely deceived : they could not have known the first principles of all great generals, which is to maturely weigh and consider the line of distance on which they were to act : it has always been of the greatest consequence in all the wars we have read of ; the lesser power being generally rendered equal in proportion to this line on which their greater adversary has to act upon. Every war of the French has proved this clearly : remark how different has been their success in the fields of Flanders, and of Germany ; added to this fundamental error in our American war . our ministers must have considered it as a war in which all Europe was interested in their own favour, otherwise they could not have given such implicit faith to the pacific language of the House of Bourbon : the most shallow politicians ought to have expected that France would interfere at the first favourable opportunity ; she risqued little by the independence of America, and might gain much : to be sure Spain plays a deeper

B game,

game, but yet it was natural to foresee that the immediate hopes of crushing our marine, and recovering the laurels they lost last war, would prevail over the remote danger and risque of losing South America. Our generals as well as our ministers seem to have been quite unacquainted both in regard to the forces and strength of America; they despised them beyond the bounds of reason; it might indeed be good policy to inspire the men with such ideas; but most unfortunate will it ever prove when such notions prevail amongst their commanders; they should have known that interest backed by enthusiasm will perform wonders; it has done it in all ages. Cromwell succeeded by this method alone; for until it was adopted by him, the parliamentary forces were worsted in every engagement; from the moment his advice was followed, the contrary effect took place. In a country like America, the war must be different likewise from any other whatsoever; there are no great towns or fortresses in the

the interior parts of the country, but a numerous body of freeholders armed and dispersed throughout the whole; by what means are such people to be controll'd, or even defeated in a strong country? The inhabitants are totally different in every respect from those of the sea coast, both as to manners and principles; yet I fear our agents and ministers judged the whole body of the people by those in the great towns on the coast, people bred up to commerce, and with mercantile ideas only. The people of New England in particular are all freeholders on a levelling system, descendants of a race whose religious and political tenets they most strictly adhere to; a most formidable nation, and impossible to be subjugated; but in this whole business so many errors have been committed both in the plans and in the execution, that for my part, I believe all parties have equal right to complain; but by what has past I am more fully convinced and confirmed in my old sentiments, that a great continental coun-

try is not to be compelled by any force, when separated by the sea, at so great a distance as America is from us: the idea of controuling continents will ever tend to our ruin, and therefore ought to be exploded.

I know very well that I shall be told of our great territorial poffessions in the East Indies, and of the wealth flowing from that country; but still I shall persevere in my idea of the impossibility of controuling continents at such a great distance; and sincerely wish we had only comptoirs there, and some island establishment of arms, artillery to protect our trade, and afford a safe retreat to our shipping. One day or other the Marrattoes, or perhaps our own people, may unfortunately for us evince the truth of my speculation: the people in different parts of that country have of late years learnt much of our methods and arts in war, by the number of officers both English and French that have served amongst them,

who have disciplined their armies according to our system, which may in the end prove of fatal consequence to our establishments. Our Indian continent will probably one day or other follow the example of America; they will find out that distance alone is sufficient to defeat the effects of all our force, and that it will not be possible for our little island to send forth the constant supplies sufficient to maintain an army there, equal to what must be required to controul such a vast continent as we possess: it appears from late transactions, that their princes have become better acquainted than they should be with the weaknesses of our government, and to have adopted many wise measures, which will put them in a situation to act more on an equality than they have heretofore done, whenever a favourable opportunity shall present itself.

OUR population has suffered much both by emigrations, and the maintenance of a military force beyond our strength; means therefore

therefore must be found out to reduce this continual drains comptoirs ; on continents and island colonies alone should be one of our first principles of government by way of forces to controul them ; our navy should be made the sole great object, and should be attended to with the utmost care. Our navy should ever be in the most formidable state, and sufficiently great ; not only for the controul of our own settlements, but also more powerful than the united marine of the House of Bourbon ; for without we are mistress of the ocean, our commerce will depend on the will of other powers ; therefore all our thoughts and expence should be turned to our marine establishment ; all modes of œconomy should be pursued in every other department, in order to enable us to complete this system, and to put it on this most respectable footing ; all other policy is wrong in our island situations, our sole attention should be to this and this alone.

WHAT

WHAT is past cannot be remedied; but I hope whenever peace is restored to our empire in all its parts, that different measures will be adopted, and that the great outline of my plan will be the fundamental system of our government; I am certain it will tend to render us more formidable than we have ever been, and at the same time it will be the most economical establishment that can be formed, consistent with the idea of ruling the ocean, and being prepared for war at a moment's notice. Now is the hour proper to begin this system; it may be completed whenever the happy day of peace shall arrive: great strokes and fundamental alterations can never take place but in stormy times; when the empire is convulsed in every part; and the necessity of the state becomes so obvious, that all agree something must be done to save her from sinking. In such a period men of talents and resolution can render essential services to their country; and most sincerely do I wish that in these deplorable times, such a man

man would appear, and shew to the world what can be done, and what are the resources of our country, when managed by intrepidity, wisdom, and real fortitude. In peaceful times apathy and supineness prevail too much; nobody will consider or look further than to what may happen in his own times. I trust therefore that these times will produce men (little looked to now) who will boldly steer us through our difficulties, and restore us to our ancient glory and flourishing situation; and by firm bold measures call forth the great resources which still remain, if properly exerted, and directed by an equal, solid, and extensive system.

~~Having~~ Having said thus much in regard to continental colonies, and the necessity of turning all our thoughts to our naval establishment, I will proceed with my ideas of alliances, and the ill consequences attending our conduct in quitting all continental European connections; and originated

nated in our ill treatment of our allies at the peace of Paris; and the same system has invariably been pursued ever since, most unfortunately for us, who otherwise might have found means to call off and divert the attention of France from her marine by a land-war, or else have made up by alliances with naval powers for the great loss we feel so essentially in being deprived of the numbers of American sailors, who served aboard our fleets and merchant ships last war, amounting to near 20,000 men, now acting against instead of for us.

THIS is the first war we ever carried on without allies, and most impolitic it is in every respect, not only from the want of support, which would have rendered the war more equal, but also in the unfortunate consequences in permitting the whole attention of France and all her money to be applied to her marine; for however inexpert they may have heretofore been, yet when a great nation gives

all the encouragement to one department, however it may be against the grain and spirit of the people, yet they will certainly in the end make great and considerable steps towards equality with their rivals, as we have already experienced: for in no former war has their navy been so well managed as in this present one; and if some fundamental errors in their marine were removed, and our false policy continues, I really should be afraid of the consequences. Why not have subsidiary treaties? or share a part of our commerce with other nations? Better it should be in their hands than in those of the House of Bourbon; it will be long if ever the former can become our rivals from many causes and reasons unnecessary to be explained: I own freely, I should give my consent most heartily to alliances with the great powers of Europe, provided our quota of engagement should be in money and ships; but as to men I never can agree to send a single person to serve in Germany, nor is it necessary as  
men

men are plenty there; if we find money, which will give velocity to their well-disciplined armies, the princes there will find men sufficient to recruit them to any numbers we shall agree to pay for. To shew our folly about men; in this very war with America we might have raised any number of recruits we pleased at less than 5l. per man delivered to our transports; a cheaper plan than our treaties with petty princes of Germany, by whom human flesh has been sold at a most exorbitant price; added to this, we might by my proposal have prevented the depopulation of our own country by the numerous levies we have made, and at a much more reasonable rate than we have enlisted them at in England: give but the word privately, and to mean low people used to this business; let it be known also that the men will be put immediately on English pay as soon as they join the transports; and you would see thousands flock down into Holland and to Stade, happy to engage in our service: as to any objection

from parliament, there could be none, as it must be a matter of indifference where the men come from provided the numbers were limited, and the places ascertained where they should serve, and being officered by Britons would in my opinion be more dependent on our government than whole corps of troops hired from the different states of Germany.

ALLIANCES in Europe are still practicable, I believe, and therefore ought to be cultivated as soon as possible, and no means left undone to give a decisive blow to the navy and commerce of France, and continue it until she is reduced to such a low pitch that we may hope for many years of peace, which never can be expected so long as she is in a situation to interfere and cope with us on the ocean.

OUR forces should be withdrawn from America, and all collected together to make some great push against the settlements of our adversaries; for weak as they

they are, and vulnerable in many places, you well know, and by destroying their resources, we shall deprive the Americans of all aid from France, and shew them clearly how little the assistance and support of the House of Bourbon is to be depended upon. We shall in effect make a greater impression upon the minds of the wisest and most considerate of them than by any effort made against themselves: by avoiding also any fresh causes of ill blood between us we shall leave time to the most moderate people to reflect, and to conciliate the minds of the many, by shewing them the happiness and benefit they would enjoy under our government, on proper and just terms of reconciliation, and how unnatural their alliance is with France and Spain, who do not assist them with any design of serving them, but for their own particular advantage. The behaviour of d'Estaing will easily convince them of this truth, and a breach is not difficult to be made between people so totally different in every idea of civil and religious

religious rights : I never did or can conceive any cordial alliance will ever subsist between a monarchical Roman Catholic and a Presbyterian Leveller ; light and darkness cannot be more opposite in their dispositions ; and whatever agreement may subsist between their agents and the House of Bourbon, I am certain that wherever two bodies of these people meet they will be more likely to fight each other than act in concert against our people.

My marine plan should be instantly begun, and our new levies reduced in proportion as the other encreased, that our half-pay list may not exceed all bounds of reason and œconomy, which must be the case if we continue raising men and adding new officers daily without filling up our old corps : by my method likewise in a short time many of the most ordinary seamen would not be wanted, and our privateers and merchant ships would not be distressed for hands, as they have hitherto been, which is a great loss to trade, and

also prevents our distressing the enemy in the manner we might do : our embargoes were necessary, but my plan fully adopted would prevent the necessity of them in future, at least to the degree to which they have been carried through necessity.

THE revisal and consideration of all our taxes collected by the customs and excise is absolutely expedient, and no time should be lost in having the real state of them drawn out, and a new plan formed for the inspection of parliament : every thing that can be regulated by excise should certainly be put into that mode, as it would tend to decrease the expence of collecting, and encrease the revenue considerably ; but at the same time great care must be taken not to interfere with the essential rights of a free people. I foresee much difficulty will arise in regulating this business : if the excise, however, could be made effectually to answer, by confining it to the vender and not to the consumer, no objection could arise, I think,

think, any more than against its operation on malsters and other people in a similar state, as it is in fact a choice of their own, which they may obviate by not entering into that profession of life, which subjects them to such inspection of the excise officer as they must exercise to perform their duty: but the controul of the excise over all consumers would be a dangerous power in the hands of government, and not proper to be trusted to any whatsoever.

GREAT pity a strict application of the Sinking Fund has not been adopted: our finances would never have been in the miserable situation they are, if during peace time it had been appropriated to the uses for which it was intended: it was a noble scheme, and nothing should have diverted its being applied to its original purposes: it is worthy the attention of the legislature; and however different the state of our finances are now and at that time, yet something good might be formed on that

that idea, and prove of great benefit to the nation, but it must be absolutely confined by parliament to the proper uses, and never misapplied during peace time.

As to the equal land-tax, I can see but one reason that can be brought against it. I mean people having given high prices for lands low taxed; but I do not think that the partial benefit of any particular set of people is to weigh against the essential good that will be derived from it to a whole nation; besides the property of individuals has not changed so frequently in the northern counties, where the land-tax is lowest, as nearer London; in the mid-land counties, property has there indeed changed hands very often: it is curious to observe how rapid the progress has been; it is scarce credible how small a time lands have remained in the same family. This might be some objection in these counties, although of little weight with me; but it has not equal force in the

counties distant from London: no act of parliament was ever pledged, or any engagement or promise held forth, that an equal land-tax should never take place. The buyers have trusted more to might than right, from the number of their representatives in proportion to the rest of England: again, how have acts of parliament been passed at one time and repealed at another, where property and interest of money were concerned? has not the public faith been violated more than once, in spite of all remonstrances of the Dutch and others who had lent their money? nay more, when the land-tax was first laid, and people gave in the value of their estates, they were assured it was only to continue during that war and no longer. Here then was a plain breach of faith to those who exerted themselves to save their country. I cannot therefore conceive why some new regulation should not take place, and if not totally, at least from the usual peace establishment, which has been generally two shillings

shillings in the pound and above, that an equal land-tax ought in the strictest sense of equity to take place: it is really making ample and sufficient allowance to those who may have bought their estates at a high valuation on that account: as to the idea of injuring agriculture, it might easily be settled by a clause inserted, exonerating all lands that were totally uncultivated for a certain number of years after their being enclosed for improvement.

ANOTHER great resource might be made to arise from the sale of church lands, and of those in public trusts. It would be of immediate benefit to the present body of men, and of essential service both to religion and agriculture. The unequal distribution of church ferment, being of the greatest detriment to the profession, and to the original institution of the pious benefactors to the church. The simplifying the net receipts of public trusts would prove also of the

utmost utility and advantage, the mismanagement and roguery practised in the direction of them being notorious, added to that, the government would be supplied with a very large loan of money at equitable and fair interest, and the benefit to the nation at large would be great; however the distress of the present times is not favourable for this plan; therefore it is only flung out as a hint that may be useful on some future occasion.

OUR military, and every other department, should be managed with the utmost frugality; loaded as we are with debts and taxes, we ought to exert ourselves, and learn from the example of other countries systems of œconomy on an extensive outline; it is become equally necessary to us as to them, unless we mean to become bankrupts; in that case the ordinary revenue of the year would certainly serve for all our absurd expensive establishments; but if we mean to pay our national debt, some great strokes of œconomy

onomy must speedily take place before it is too late ; all our departments must be new modelled, and our measures regulated upon a different footing ; the only expence we should not be sparing in is our marines and navy, in these we should remember that our salvation depends, and that we should keep up such an establishment, as never to dread a war with the House of Bourbon, but to be prepared in such a manner, and to have our forces on such a superior footing, as to be equally ready with them at a moment's warning, that a decisive blow may not be struck by them before we are in a situation to defend ourselves as has been often the case, and must be from our present establishment ; to attempt the accomplishing this great idea is my intention, arising from a retrospect of the danger we were nearly incurring in the year 1778. In the first place our marines should be encreased, and always kept up even in peace time, to the number of our whole present military peace establishment ; of which last body, if we had no continental

continental wars, we could have little use for, but in what, at least, the marines and artillery would answer better than a mere land army. It is a corps unnatural to the idea of an island constitution ; every thing belonging to one should be amphibious, and tend to the great object of raising our navy forces to the highest pitch our finances will allow of ; for without ruling the ocean we are nothing : observe also from the French how much better their marine artillery is served than ours, owing to their having learnt the use of great guns on shore, by which our rigging and masts have severely suffered, and we have felt the effects of marine artillery so much better served and directed than ours. Our marines practise only musquetry, whereas they should add to it likewise a knowledge of the use of great guns ; at present, being only musqueteers, they all remain on deck, and interfere with the working of the ship, whilst the able seamen are obliged to do the duty of the ordinary men, I recommend that at least one half

or

or more of the ship's crew should be marines, and this I believe many of our naval officers have wished also, knowing from experience how serviceable they are, and how much preferable to the ragamuffins that are pressed on an exigency from all parts, and of all denominations; it would avoid also many distempers on board our ships from the people taken fresh from gaols, which have proved fatal to whole crews. Supposing such a plan should be put into execution, of what infinite utility would be such an amphibious body at the eve of a war? reflect only if instead of infantry we had twenty thousand of these brave experienced fellows to put on board our fleet at a moment's warning; if this was the case, we should be on an equal footing with France and Spain, and every attempt of theirs to distress us by a coup de main would be foiled, the only kind of invasion, indeed, we ever have had, or need to fear; no other can ever take place until our fleet is totally destroyed, and the command of the channel

channel entirely theirs, free from all danger of an attack. What a vast saving would it be in bounty money to ordinary seamen, besides the additional one in bounty money to picked men for their looks, which amounts to a great sum in the army, where outward appearance is so much considered; whereas in fact, for real service, a little man is generally stronger, more active, and able to endure fatigue. How little pressing would be necessary to what it is now? what ease to our trade and privateers? what strength to us, and distress to our enemies? it would enable us to give greater encouragement to our able seamen, which would be then the only men wanted on an emergency; and of these even less would be necessary than oftentimes serve on board a ship at present.

IN peace these marines would do equally well all our duty in Great Britain, Ireland, and in our colonies, if mixed with a proportionable number of artillery to serve

serve with them, and on the breaking out of a war, and the embarkation of the marines, the militia and fencibles should be immediately called forth for the internal defence of the country, and these acting with a formidable train of artillery, would be sufficient for any exigency, when protected by such a fleet: this would be a constitutional establishment, and connected closely with our island situation.

*and a strong blow and aid in it*  
**ANOTHER** advantage would be, that in hot climates the men might be relieved oftener, and numberless lives saved; it being remarked by Dr. Lynd, that a sea voyage immediately relieves the persons attacked by the disorders incident to those countries: each king's ship therefore should be ordered to change his crew of marines, and take away those who were ill, or with whom the climate disagreed more particularly, as is the case with many people, and especially the highlanders.

*new battle*  
**E** **MOREOVER**

MOREROVER a fleet thus equipped, will have such a body of land forces on board, as will enable it to carry terror and devastation on the enemy's coasts, particularly in their distant colonies, without the expences and delays attending the transporting of troops in the usual manner. All the forces of Spain and France would not be sufficient to guard their own coasts, much less to invade ours.

Thus this body would become a fluctuating corps, inured to the sea as well as land, and partaking in some measure of the artillery, which latter corps must be also encreased greatly as a most useful body, especially in this age, according to the present method of carrying on war: the marines must learn the use of great guns ashore, as well as small arms and pikes; for on board our ships great part of them should serve between decks, under the command of their lieutenants acting as masters of arms, as was the old fashioned way in Cromwell's time, when

our

our navy made no inconsiderable figure in Europe ; the captains and captains lieutenants might serve on deck with a proper number of musquetry men, but not too many, so as to interfere with the working of the ship by the able seamen. In sieges part of these men would act in the batteries under their lieutenants, whilst the captains might command the battalions to cover them ; for without continental wars our service would be reduced chiefly to this and in serving our fleet : this marine corps should only be enlisted for six years, and should also have their discharge on becoming able seamen, and being passed as such by the proper officers of the navy appointed to examine them ; added to which, the great numbers of non-commissioned officers would be a further stimulation, as I would have as many to each company as the artillery has, and in the same proportion : such as serjeants, corporals, bombardiers, gunners, &c. &c. and in war-time, when the companies should be increased from 130 men, the

peace establishment, to 200 in war, the two best serjeants should be then appointed second lieutenants but to rise no higher: this would be a most useful institution, and by having so few commissioned officers and no field officers, it would prevent disputes with the navy; it would prove a great saving to the nation, and an annihilation almost of the half-pay list: in order however to provide a body of officers, ready always to fill up the vacancies, a strong corps of cadets should be attached to the marines, and formed on the same model as that belonging to the artillery, and as practised in several foreign services; half the men of these companies should have leave of absence for six or nine months in the year, to serve aboard our fishing vessels to Greenland, Newfoundland, &c. upon the same plan as in the Prussian service; where half the companies are permitted to pursue husbandry and agriculture, &c. for nine months each year, which is a great saving to the state, and benefit to the country: a similar or greater advan-

advantage would accrue to us from our men serving in our great fisheries, that nursery of our boldest and best sailors, that fund of wealth and glory to the empire, which cannot be too much encouraged by us, and discouraged in other nations : the seventy men to be added to each company in war time, should be enlisted during peace, and engaged only to serve whenever that event should take place, during the term of ten years from the day of enlisting, and these engagements should be inserted in the parish books ; in case of change of habitation, a fresh insertion should be made at the place wherein they may settle : numbers would be induced to enlist, and accept the bounty money, for a chance of serving, which perhaps might never happen during the period they engaged for ; great care should be observed in accepting none but very young lads, and each company should confine itself to particular districts, that they might not have to search for their recruits in distant places one from the other.

To

To each ten companies should be appointed a colonel and two majors: the colonel to be taken out of the captains, but the major to be promoted out of the adjutants; these field officers never go to sea, but to remain at home always to superintend the recruits, with the assistance of a proper number of non-commissioned officers, and in peace time to command the whole division or battalion, and to report the state of it to a council of war; the emoluments, however, of each company to belong to the captain, and the colonel's pay to be made equal to it, as I would have the latter quite unconnected with the companies. The council should always be fixed and established in London, upon the plan of M. de St. Germain. It should consist of four artillery, four marine, and four naval officers, perhaps it may be thought necessary to add four dragoon officers, by this means every probable dispute might be settled before the orders were issued from this board, which consisting of officers in each department, would prevent many disputes that might otherwise

otherwise arise from want of explanations of the nature of the service, and the difficulties that actually do arise amongst the officers in the execution of plans by corps of different establishments.

By my plan the expence of our establishment would be greatly reduced innumerable expensive articles; our general's staff in particular, which is of no use whatsoever but for parade: we should become in time a nation of seamen, and of that amphibious nature, that would be equally serviceable on the sea and on land, adding practice to theory in those branches particularly wherein the French now excel us, more especially their marine artillery; it would make up for the loss of American sailors, and prepare us for any future war with the House of Bourbon, by encouraging, and putting on a respectable footing the navy of Great Britain in all its different parts, ready at a short notice to act against our natural enemies; it would be the means of keeping our colonies in more

more awe from the knowledge of our being yprepared for any sudden event, and would render us formidable and respectable in the eyes of Europe, without distressing ourselves, or draining our country.

IN addition to this, a general naturalization was to pass, the depopulation of Great Britain would be greatly made up for : it is well known that no introduction of foreigners could effect our constitution, for they would adopt our manners and customs. as was the case of our foreign ancestors, and of every state where the lesser body has settled amongst the more numerous : the air of Great Britain would equally inspire their successors with the same principles which ought to actuate a great and free people. Interest will ever teach men to follow what is most for their benefit, and no man in his senses, born in Great Britain, will ever wish to lessen those rights he is by birthright entitled to, and for the enjoyment of which his parents quitted their own country

from

from a sense of the superior merit of our laws, and the happiness derived from our civil liberty : the same clauses to the man who is naturalized should exist as at present, viz. as to the holding places of trust, &c. &c. in other respects they should enjoy every benefit in the free use of their religion, as well as in every right of a British subject.

THERE is still one most necessary thing to be attended to, which requires the attention of parliament ; our decrease of timber, and the rapid decay of our shipping : it is well known to all people concerned in the dock yards, that these two evils predominate to a degree that may prove fatal to us, arising from foreign timber with which our vessels are built in general, and from our wet docks, and letting our ships lie moored in our rivers : the foreign timber is not of the close grain of ours, in no respect equal ; one vessel built of English oak will last out four vessels built of foreign oak ; owing to the

F close-

closeness of the grain of ours from the slowness of its growth. Parliament has indeed taken some trifling steps in favour of the cultivating the growth of timber in the king's forests; but it was not done on a plan sufficiently extensive; all the king's rights in his forests, and elsewhere (except where he resides, and may wish to keep them up for his own pleasure) should be divided and separated as in Enfield Chace; but in lieu of letting at a low rent his portion of the soil, it should be enclosed and planted entirely with oak and elm for the benefit of the navy of Great Britain, and this should be done at the expence of parliament, under the direction of proper officers appointed by it; and in order to form a fund for it, great part of the king's rights to be sold, and appropriated to this planting fund, and especially all those rents which he receives in money. Premiums of large value should be given to those who would sow, plant, and enclose a certain number of acres of soil proper for the growth of oak,

oak, and a certain annual stipend should be paid to those who maintained their fences in a proper condition to keep out all sorts of cattle; the ground should also be excused paying tythe. There are many old acts of parliament now considered as useless, which, if revived and published, would be a great encouragement to planting; few people will plant oak on account of its slow growth, the immediate great expence attending it, and likewise the loss of rent for many years; therefore all methods should be thought of, and pursued in order to encourage the growth of it: in enclosures, certain portions of land should be ordered to be set aside for planting, and no lord of the manor should be permitted to enclose, but on agreeing to such terms as these, in proportion to the quantity of land he should receive for his share out of the commons and waste land; and subject to the inspection of the officers appointed by parliament to look after the king's timber, with penalties in case of default. As I

am upon the subject of enclosures, I beg leave to recommend one other scheme relative to cottagers, which is, that instead of giving to each a small allotment of land, which is soon sold, and the family brought into distress and poverty, I would advise that the allotment to the cottagers should be given to them collectively in a body, in proportion to their utmost right, free from all claim of the lord or great farmers, who ever oppress and ruin the commons of the poor by over-stocking them : this portion of the cottagers to be in the spot the most proper for feeding and mowing, to be divided into two pieces under the direction of two persons yearly chosen by the cottagers to superintend this ground, with a power in them to call out their brethren at certain times of the year to drain, clear, and keep the commons in proper condition ; and as one piece should be allotted to feeding, so the other should be kept for mowing, and the produce divided amongst them, by which method they would be able to maintain their beasts  
the

the whole year: this is one of the reasons made use of by them for not being able to keep cows, few having a little close or home-stall to afford fodder for their cattle in winter, which difficulty would be obviated by my plan; and I am convinced they would take proper care of their commons, if the overbearing farmers were deprived of all possibility of ever interfering with them, but otherwise nothing can be expected from people under such oppression as they now are; they are so depressed, and the commons rendered of such little use, that they are easily induced to accept of any trifling present advantage in lieu of their ideal right. The loss the nation has received from the enclosing commons, engrossing of farms, and pulling down of cottages, will be severely felt in a few years, and more especially now Ireland has got a free trade; as she will have sufficient employment for all her idle people, who have hitherto come over to assist yearly in getting in our hay and harvest.

IN

IN regard to the wet docks and mooring in the rivers, they are most detrimental and ruinous to our navy ; but how this is to be obviated and remedied I know not without a great expence : in my opinion the best way would be to offer large premiums, and perhaps some scheme might be struck out which might prove of public benefit : no other means however will answer equally well to dry docks, and therefore they should be adopted as far as our finances will allow ; and although the expence might be great, yet it appears to be absolutely necessary from the speedy destruction of our navy, and the very great annual expence in repairing it, as well as from the uncertainty of the situation on an emergency.

ACCORDING to my idea it would be a real saving, without even the first expence bearing any proportion to the now present annual one in peace time.

EVERY

EVERY landed gentleman should seriously consider the real state of Great Britain in this present moment, and should offer to the public the means by which she may be extricated from her deplorable situation, which will become still worse if some means are not struck out to lessen our expences, to increase our revenues, and to put us in a way of regaining our lost empire of the sea.

WHAT will be our situation at the conclusion of a peace, supposing that was to happen to-morrow ; we should be like unto a man at the end of a violent fever, who during that period had exerted himself beyond his force, and had in consequence exhausted his strength beyond the power of recovery : such would be our state, I fear. An immense debt, taxes laid on every article of life, and stretched to the utmost bounds by the fertile imagination of man : in articles of luxury, which have hitherto borne a great share of the weight, decreasing every day from the multiplicity

multiplicity of charges, and from the inability of individuals to indulge themselves as formerly : for in proportion as taxes increase luxury must decrease when arrived at a certain pitch : it will hold good to a certain point, it is true ; but beyond that it must fall ; for the very articles and necessaries of life will become scarcely attainable by the many, and the land must ultimately bear the whole burthen : each day proves how necessary it is for families of consequence even to lessen their establishments, and that must pervade throughout every inferior department of the people ; it will affect our manufactures in equal proportion, and make labour so much dearer, that in every other part of Europe they will undersell us, and of course our commerce must drop : we shall have no three millions of people in America to controul, and obliged to take our own manufactures at our own prices : the West India islands will soon follow their example and emancipate themselves ; they will be obliged to it even

even if not willing or inclined to do it : Ireland by her free trade, her more eligible situation, and the cheapness of labour in that country, will rob us of many of our merchants and manufacturers, who will go and settle there in preference to remaining in Great Britain, where they cannot carry on their trade at the same prices and with equal advantage. This indeed is what I fear from the free trade of Ireland more than her own industry ; added to this, our people, not connected with the land itself, will, in consequence of the failure and stagnation of work, emigrate to America, &c. &c. &c. we shall become a depopulated nation loaded with debts and taxes, without the means of extricating ourselves by any method whatsoever ; all this I dread and foresee, unless some fundamental, great, and truly æconomical system is adopted and begun immediately : for however flourishing our manufactures may appear at present, they are not so in fact from the exportation of them, which

G is

is the great source of riches to a country : the briskness of our trade, and the immediate demand for consumption, is at home occasioned merely by an expensive war : whenever government spends such immense sums of money annually, it is the usual and natural consequence ; but this is not the true permanent trade, but a false artificial one that must soon be at an end, and the peace will be the epocha when this naked truth will appear, whatever may now be said to the contrary. Our marine must be restored to its former lustre, if we mean to controul our colonies, and oblige them to take our manufactures in return for our protection ; we must prove to them and all Europe that we can do it, and that our system is such as will enable us to continue it to them : by my plan of new-modelling the army and marine establishment this will be clearly proved to them ; it will be a great yearly saving at the same time to the state, and put us in a situation to remedy the inconveniences we have hitherto been under at the

beginning of a war, of not being able to man our fleets for a considerable time; two other great benefits will arise also out of my plan, that our marine-artillery will be better served, and the lives of our countrymen saved, and rendered less precarious by the continually moving of them in hot climates, and not leaving them so long together in unhealthful spots until whole corps have died off, and a few officers only have returned back out of whole regiments sent out complete.

OUR military establishment is at present the most expensive and most useless one in Europe: in 1772, ten years after the peace, the half-pay list alone consisted then in Great Britain and Ireland of 2,400 officers; and no wonder, when all the commissions were filled up at the very eve of the last peace, and the establishment after that consisted of three officers, and seven others non-commissioned, and musick; besides adjutants, chaplains, and surgeons to

each troop of horse and dragoons of 28 men on the British and of 21 men only on the Irish establishment ; almost as many officers as men ! and in the infantry the same number of officers to 42 men on the British and 28 on the Irish establishment ; and all this expence to a country, whose fundamental principles should be to have no army, no continental wars, but a respectable fleet, equal to the defence and controul of our colonies, and to encounter at all times the whole united naval force of the House of Bourbon : our military establishment is not adapted to our island situation, and yet we have persevered in increasing it upon the most expensive terms possible, which must prove destructive to us, not only in point of present expence, but in future : how much more eligible would it have been to have raised all the new levies as marines, and have had men equally serviceable by sea and land ? “ *Quos Deus vult perdere prius de-  
mentat,*” is very applicable to our present political system.

I AM

I AM sensible that my plan, if adopted, will be severely felt by the gentlemen of the army; and most sincerely sorry I am that the necessities of the nation are so great as to render it absolutely expedient, that some essential fundamental œconomical system should be adopted and persevered in: I wish most heartily that our situation was the very reverse of what it is; but they must reflect, that we must either become a bankrupt, and our trade crippled, unless we put all our establishments on a different footing: something must be done to save us from sinking into nothing; the relief must be speedy likewise; and the few must be contented to suffer for the salvation of the many. I therefore can make no other apology, but what every one of them must feel, who has any connection with landed property: no palliatives or half measures will do; the Gordian knot must be cut, or the country is undone.

## A PLAN



no set of men equal to them in the world, except the 1000 picked men of subalterns and lieutenants, who are now in every army, and are now to be increased by **A** thousand, and be added to the rest of the army, so as to

# PLAN

FOR NEW-MODELLING THE

## BRITISH FORCES

BY LAND AND SEA.

**T**H E dragoons in Great Britain to be divided into six regiments, mounted like Elliot's and Bourgoyne's: it is well known that their carbines are of little service; they ought to have long pikes or long strait swords like the cavalry of Charles the Twelfth, at least a part of each regiment.

ONE

ONE regiment of dragoons to be on the king's duty in rotation for the space of one year; part to be in the stables of the horse-guards and horse-grenadiers, and another part at the usual residence of the king during the summer season.

ONE regiment of dragoons to be within ten miles of London, and to patrol the great roads within that distance of the metropolis, under the orders and directions of the civil power.

THE other four regiments to do the coast-duty in Great Britain. The same regulations, and in the same proportions, to be followed in Ireland.

EACH troop to consist of four commissioned officers and a proper number of non-commissioned officers, together with one hundred men rank and file.

THE artillery corps cannot be better established than at present, by all I can learn; .

learn ; but in Ireland it is shamefully neglected, and of no use whatsoever : this latter corps must therefore be new-modelled, and put into the same situation as that in England, and both increased to the numbers in my list ; for according to the modern system of making war, a numerous and well-regulated artillery is become essentually necessary.

THE marine corps should consist of four officers to each company of one hundred and thirty men in peace time, besides four serjeants, four corporals, and four bombardiers, and to each ten companies should be appointed a colonel and two majors ; but these should have nothing to do with the profits of each company, which should belong to the captains : the colonel's pay to be made proportionable as well as the major's, but to be kept entirely separate : the captains to go to the rank of colonel at once, and out of the adjutants corps to be chosen the majors : these officers, to prevent disputes with the

navy about rank, are always to remain at home in time of war: they will manage the recruiting, overlook and drill the recruits, direct the non-commisioned officers, and command the marine companies at home; they will likewise report to the council of war the state of each company on its return from service, and will report the wants and losses they have suffered.

IN actual service the numbers, rank and file, should be increased to two hundred men per company; and in order that no time may be lost in completing them, these 70 men per company should be enlisted in peace time, to serve whenever the event of war shall take place: I imagine numbers would enlist under that idea, as perhaps the case would never happen in their lives; and if in addition to this a certain limited time was allowed, it would make the recruiting still more reasonable and easy. If such a plan was followed, care must be taken only to enlist

very young men of 16 or 17 years of age at most ; and each company should enlist in a particular district, that it might not have to search for its recruits throughout all Great Britain : nay more, the recruits should not be allowed to leave their parishes unless they gave some sort of security where they may be found whenever called upon.

I APPREHEND much money might be saved by this plan, as men would engage at a low price for an uncertain event ; and, added to this, the size of men would be of no consideration in this marine corps. Strength and activity are necessary, but these are oftener found in short than in tall men. Consider what a saving in bounty money, and what a certainty of compleating each company at the moment of war breaking out,

IN peace time one half of each company should have leave of absence for six or nine months in each year, to serve on

H 2 board

board our fishing vessels, engaged in the Greenland and Newfoundland fisheries ; by this method they would become inured to the sea in peace time, by that most lucrative branch of our commerce, those nurseries of our bold seamen ; which ought to be encouraged by us as much as possible, and discouraged in other nations : by this plan we should become a nation of seamen in a course of years, particularly if the marines were enlisted for six years only during a peace. They should be entitled to their discharge also on becoming able seamen, and being passed as such by the proper officers appointed to examine them. The great number of non-commissioned officers would likewise prove an additional stimulation : added to this, in war time I would appoint the two best serjeants (in each company) to the rank of second lieutenants, but to rise no higher ; this would prove of infinite use.

To this corps of marines should be appointed a very strong corps of cadets, as is

is done to our artillery, and as is usual in many foreign services. This would be a nursery for officers, who would be understanding in their profession, and ready to fill up all vacancies.

IN war time the two head officers of each company to serve on deck with a proper number of men, but not too many, otherwise they will interfere with the working of the ship by the able seamen : the residue of the officers to serve between decks with the rest of the marines, in managing and directing the great guns.

AT present our establishment is merely a marine musquetry ; whereas to render it perfectly useful, the corps should learn on shore the use of great guns, as well as the use of small arms. It is by this method that the French marine artillery is so much better served and directed than ours, as witness the effects of their artillery in this present war on our rigging, masts, &c.

How

How much superior ours would be, I have not the least doubt, when the theory learnt on shore came to be practised by men inured to the sea, and whose genius leads them naturally to the sovereignty of that element.

THESE men should likewise have pikes in case of landing, and being engaged either with horse or foot, in such case the captains might command the battalions to cover the artillery. Thus we should be equally formidable by land and by sea, especially in sieges, which would be the principal thing our forces could be engaged in on land, if we had no continental wars.

IN peace time the marines at home should be in barracks in Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham, Woolwich, and at Edinburgh, besides the king's duty ; and as the inn-keepers would in consequence be exonerated of all the expence and trouble attendant on the quartering of troops,

I think

I think they should pay a tax in lieu of it, for the maintenance and support of the barracks, &c. to be called The Barrack Tax.

ONE company of each battalion, consisting of the recruits, should always be at Woolwich with the artillery, that they might learn the use of great guns.

At this place should likewise be the corps of cadets; at the Tower should be ten companies of marines.

At the Savoy should be thirty companies of marines, to do the immediate duty of the king himself in London.

In all these barracks the men should be obliged to mess together, it being well known they might live as well again by this method than they can do separately.

To prevent all disputes about rank, and to allow the king an officer of rank as commander

commander of the guard, the Gold Stick in waiting shall always be considered as commander of all the guard whatsoever, either horse or foot.

THE Tower and Savoy guard to remain on duty for one year only, and to change with each other at the end of half the year.

THE pay of the absent men to be divided into three parts ; one third to the men, one to the captain, and the other to the public ; and the cloathing of these men to serve two years instead of one : something more œconomical might be done as in foreign service.

THE men to be cloathed for use and comfort, and not for shew.

ALL the establishments might have the same permission of granting furloughs to **sixty men** out of each 130, the peace este-

establishment, except there was any reason to expect a sudden breaking out of war, or commotions in our colonies ; in that case to be authorized with full powers not to grant these furloughs, as would naturally be the case in Great Britain in a similar situation. This caution to be observed according to the appearances of things in general ; and it should be regulated, that if the companies were incomplete, a less number should have leave of absence, as the companies should never consist of less than fifty men effective ; and upon this idea I have formed the companies of the king's own guard, supposing the whole forty companies to consist of two thousand effectives, rank and file.

A COUNCIL of war should always be sitting in London, under the orders of the king in person, composed of his first lord of the admiralty and secretary at war for the time being, four general officers, viz. one admiral, one of cavalry, one of artillery, one of the marines ; one

of each should be president in his turn for one month at a time. And the council should consist of four naval captains, four artillery, four marine, and four dragoon captains, who should have no companies or ships at that moment of time, during the period of holding this office of counsellor; but whose pay should be equal to the benefit of these companies, and should consist of men whose health or accidents should have rendered them unable to serve abroad in person. To this council all letters, petitions, and reports should be made from the different corps of marines and dragoons, and also any disputes that might arise between the artillery, navy, and marine corps. As my establishment is of an amphibious nature, so likewise should be the council of war: it would prevent many disputes in the executive duty, by having been first considered and settled by persons who had long served in each profession, and whose experience and age would render them proper judges; half

of this council should annually review all the barracks in person, and on their return make their report to the council, with their remarks and opinion of the state of every thing and every person ; one out of each department should go to Ireland, and one out of each throughout Great Britain, the remaining number to continue sitting in London ; every thing to be determined by the majority of voices. The vice-president should be a lawyer, or a man brought up from his youth to business, who should keep all the journals and books of the council, and all the letters and petitions, with the answers to them ; and under this person should be two head clerks, who should take the copies, &c. under his direction, and in whom forne confidence might be placed, that in case of sickness they might act in the place of the vice-president ; but the vice-president to have no vote in the council.

IN case of any difficulty about Ireland, this council may be lessened to three of

I 2 each

each department, and a similar council appointed at Dublin upon the same plan.

**BARRACKS, &c.** for the marines, artillery, &c. to be erected in Ireland, and the same plan uniformly pursued in both kingdoms, and corps of cadets to the marines, artillery, &c. but in all respects to keep them as nearly as possible on an equality, that no jealousy may ensue between the different corps, as their service must be intermixed to render it useful.

**THE** corps of engineers will continue as at present; but pains taken to render them of as much use as possible, and not to be nominal corps of non-effect, as still is more the case of the artillery in Ireland.

**THE** militia of England to consist of 40,000 men: that there may be always above 30,000 effectives upon service, besides all the serjeants, corporals, drums, &c. &c.

**THE** fencibles of Scotland to be about six or eight thousand men.

**THE**

The fencibles of Ireland to be about twelve or sixteen thousand men.

THESE men should have pikes as well as fire arms. My reason for mentioning pikes is, that I am rather of opinion with Machiavel, that art will in the long run be obliged to give way to nature, and in the end will prevail. Certain it is musquetry do very little execution: it is surprising how few balls ever take place, and what injury your own people receive, generally greater in proportion than the enemy. Turenne, indeed, was of a contrary opinion, and thought that artillery alone would decide all battles and all wars. Indeed the late wars in Germany seem to declare in favour of Turenne's idea: mine, however, is, that both these maxims should be united to render an army complete; it should consist of a numerous artillery, and the rest of the army be provided with a proportionable number of armes blanches: in many instances artillery cannot act from the situation

tion of the ground ; in those cases recourse might be had to the powerful arms of nature, which certainly will prevail over an equal body of musquetry as at present.

THE militia of London wants new modelling to render it of some use, and out of that body a sufficient number should be reserved by way of city guard, to do all the services required by its magistrates, and to enforce the orders of the civil power; to serve as watch, and not to have the poor decrepid guard now kept up by way of preservative to our lives and properties. This would effectually prevent robberies and house-breaking; and they would be ready at hand in case of sudden riots, to assist at fires, &c. without having resort on every trifling emergency to the king's troops; who should never be sent for but when the civil power had exerted all its force, and been found ineffectual, in which case the troops should seriously

seriously act, and the ringleaders be severely punished.

THE first step taken to bring about this plan, should be to raise the artillery and marines to the complete war establishment, and in proportion as these two bodies increased the army should be reduced gradually ; it would prevent the half-pay list increasing to the enormous degree it must otherwise do, if the disbanding the army was done on a sudden, and at once without any other corps being ready to receive the officers and men ; whereas, by the increasing one establishment, and reducing another at the same time in equal proportion, sufficient employment would be found for at least the greatest part of the people, besides other inconveniences avoided. The half-pay indeed would increase in spite of all this prudent regulation, but nothing in comparison of what it will even do now at the end of this war ; besides some douceurs might be secretly given to those who would enter into the

the marine corps, and had been at some expences in procuring their army commissions.

IN regard to the king's guards, I can see no use in keeping them up; on the contrary, much good would arise from breaking them: in this, however, I would pay all attention to the king's wishes; yet I cannot conceive the king could consider it as the least derogatory to his dignity to be without guards, seeing that the emperor and other monarchs have none, but on the contrary have broke theirs; therefore nothing is intended, but that the King of the Isles should have his troops suitable to the island situation in which his empire is; for as sovereign of the ocean he should have every thing about him of that amphibious nature, that can tend to the maintenance of his authority over it: his distant colonies can only be supported and controlled by his naval power; therefore all means should be thought of to increase

crease it beyond the dread of our natural rivals and enemies taking part against us when engaged in a quarrel with our colonists. However, if the king should nevertheless desire to keep his guards, four battalions would certainly do all the duty required on his own person on the same establishment as at present (if meant for parade only) making 1692 effective men, at 47 men per company rank and file ; but it would be a great saving in officers if the four battalions were reduced to two, each company being doubled in numbers. These two battalions might be kept complete by some similar plan of enlisting as I have mentioned for the marines ; no working men to be allowed (but a table kept for all the officers on the king's guard) : this number of men would be sufficient for all the king's duty on his own person ; for at present we know that 32 men per company do all that duty, including Windsor, Hampton-court, Richmond, &c. &c. making in all but 1472 men on paper ; this how-

K

ever

ever is exclusive of the two battalions in the Tower and Savoy: the Tower might be done either by the invalids or marines out of the battalions at Chatham; and the king's guard at his country palaces might likewise be done by the invalids, or rather by the dragoons, which should and ought to be there, that the men and horses might be relieved and changed whenever the king came and returned the same day to London, as the duty is now very severe and ruinous to the horses.

My establishment \* would consist of

		Men.	Com. Officers.
Dragoons	- - -	6000	240
Artillery	- - -	3,200	256
Marines	- - -	38,480	1,184
Invalids	- - -	3,000	120
		—————	—————
Total	- - -	50,680	1,800

\* See p. 82, 83, 84.

THE

## THE establishment of 1772 \*.

	Men.	Com. Officers.
Horse and dragoons	4,560	543
Artillery	2,000	200
Infantry	27,716	2,362
Invalids	940	60
Marines	3,290	280
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	38,506	3,445

To be added to my establishment 30 colonels of the 30 battalions, 60 majors to the same, total 90; makes the officers amount to 1,890 total. The difference in the two establishments, in favour of mine, there would be 1,555 officers less than in 1772, and 12,174 men more than in 1772. When the immense saving by this reduction of officers is computed, it must strike every one most forcibly, and more especially if we reflect on the rank of the greater number to be reduced being of the highest and most expensive order: the general staff will be reduced in equal proportion; besides, the half-pay

\* See p. 79, 80, 81.

list will be annihilated as soon as those upon it now (by the old regulation) are dead : these amounted in 1772 (ten years after the war) in Great Britain and Ireland, to the enormous number of 2,381 ; which, added to the 1,555, makes the total of officers, totally unnecessary, 3,936, which, joined to our staff, makes a little army of itself at an immense charge to the nation, an expence unknown in other states.

Be pleased to reflect also upon the saving by bounty-money, and by the third of the pay of the absentee men out upon furloughs and in our fisheries. These two articles alone will almost make up for the additional numbers employed ; but when we come to consider the pay of such numbers of officers, staff, &c. it will be very great indeed : whoever has seen the expensive articles for extraordinaries in continental wars must still more approve of my island plan ; for the sums paid in bat and baggage money, and contingent articles,

ties, are sufficient alone to ruin a great nation; all which will be avoided entirely. Added to this, that whatever money is spent by our marine establishment will center at home, and not enrich other kingdoms at our expence, as we have fatally experienced in our former wars. By moving these marine corps continually, and permitting the half of them to be absent so long together, the lives of many will be saved in our settlements abroad, and has caused me to make my colony establishments so high, in order to allow of this absence without hurting the service: our men will likewise be inured to weather, and not fit for parade only, as in the case of ours and the French troops, from not being suffered to work, but confined in towns, brought up in idleness and debauchery, dressed and formed more for a stage than for real utility: this is not my observation alone, but of the ablest generals in all the foreign services who have wrote upon the subject; and many of the French in particular have wished the con-

finement part of the service altered in every respect.

THE having such a number of marines ready to put on board our fleets at a short notice, and the easy method of increasing the corps to their full compliments at the moment of war breaking out, I trust, will be approved of, as well as the short time of enlisting, as it all tends to my great object of removing the evils we lie under at the beginning of a war: it places us upon an equal footing in that respect with the House of Bourbon; it is a plan founded upon œconomy; and, which is of still more consequence, will render our marine the most respectable in Europe.



1772.

## 1772. GREAT BRITAIN.

	Per Troop.	Total Men.	Commis. Officers.
2 Troops of Horse Guards	142	284	36
2 Troops of Horse Grenadiers	115	230	18
9 Troops of Blues	—	28	27
81 Troops of Dragoons	—	28	243
		<hr/>	
	Total	3027	324

Besides Adjutants, Surgeons, Chaplains, and the Non-commissioned Officers, Musick, &c. &c. also the stoppages of men for the officers, &c. &c.

64 Companies of Guards	—	47	3008	192
189 Companies of Infantry	—	42	7980	630
70 Companies of Marines	—	47	3290	280
12 Companies of Invalids	—	47	564	36
24 Companies of Artillery	—	50	1200	120
			<hr/>	
	Total	16042	1258	

Besides the corps of cadets and engineers.

## 1772. In IRELAND.

24 Troops of Horse	—	21	504	72
51 Troops of Dragoons	—	21	1071	153
			<hr/>	
	Total	1575	225	
189 Companies of Infantry	—	28	5292	630
4 Companies of Artillery	—	50	200	20
			<hr/>	
	Total	5492	650	

N. B. This establishment of Ireland was when she paid for 12,000 men only; it has since been increased to 15,000.

There appears to have been a great deficiency; but I believe some of their regiments were employed in our garrisons; otherwise the non-commissioned officers, &c. could not make up the complement paid for.

N. B. There was a corps of engineers in Ireland.

## 1772. In AMERICA.

	Per Troop.	Total	Commis. Men.	Officers.
117 Companies of Infantry	— 42	4914	390	

## 1772. In GIBRALTAR.

63 Companies of Infantry	— 42	2616	210	
4 Companies of Artillery	— 50	200	20	
		Total	2816	230

## 1772. In MINORCA.

45 Companies of Infantry	— 42	1890	150	
4 Companies of Artillery	— 50	200	20	
		Total	2090	170

1772. In the CARIBBEE ISLANDS,  
JAMAICA and ANTIGUA.

	Per Comp.			
45 Companies of Infantry	— 42	1890	150	

## 1772. In JERSEY and GUERNSEY.

8 Companies of Invalids	— 47	376	24	
-------------------------	------	-----	----	--

## 1772. In AFRICA.

3 Companies of Infantry	— 42	126	10	
-------------------------	------	-----	----	--

Total

	Men.	Officers.
Total of the Horse and Dragoons in GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND	4560	543
Artillery	1600	160
Infantry	16844	1488
Marines	3290	280
Infantry in AMERICA and our garrisons abroad	11812	934
Artillery	400	40
<b>Total</b>	<b>38506</b>	<b>3445</b>

The non-commissioned officers, &c. &c. is more than double the number of commissioned officers.

(Errors excepted.)

It is almost impossible to know to a certainty the real state of every regiment, and especially of those in Ireland; but I have reason to believe, from all the printed books, and from the information of officers, that this calculation per company was the general idea of the army, and was nearly the truth.

L UTOPIAN

## UTOPIAN PLAN.

## PEACE ESTABLISHMENT.

## G R E A T B R I T A I N.

	Per Troop.	Total Men.	Commis. Officers.
36 Troops of Light Dragoons	100	3600	144
100 Companies of Marines	—	130	13000
16 Companies of Artillery	—	100	1600
20 Companies of Invalids	—	100	2000
		Total	608
		16600	

Besides Adjutants, Surgeons, Chaplains, and the  
the Non-commissioned Officers, Musick, &c. &c.  
N. B. A corps of cadets to the marines as well as  
to the artillery ; also a corps of engineers.

## In I R E L A N D.

24 Troops of Light Dragoons	100	2400	96
70 Companies of Marines	—	130	9100
8 Companies of Artillery	—	100	800
10 Companies of Invalids	—	100	1000
		Total	384
		10900	

N. B. A corps of engineers.

Quære. Whether it would be necessary to have a  
corps of cadets to the marines and artillery ; or  
to make those corps stronger in England ?

An

## An Establishment in an healthy Island :

A second Gibraltar in strength, with a commodious harbour for our ships to refit at, and to resort to as a safe retreat in bad weather, or in any case of distress; and when the currents on the American coast, &c. would not let them keep their stations.

	Per Troop.	Total	Commis. Men.	Officers.
70 Companies of Marines	— 130	9100	280	
6 Companies of Artillery	— 100	600	48	
		<hr/>		
	Total	9700	328	

## In G I B R A L T A R.

30 Companies of Marines	— 130	3900	120
2 Companies of Artillery	— 100	200	16
		<hr/>	
	Total	4100	136

If an harbour can be made at Gibraltar secure and safe, under the protection of the cannon, Minorca would be of little use, and the expense of it might be saved.

In the C A R I B B E E I S L A N D S,  
J A M A I C A and A N T I G U A.

	Per Comp.		
18 Companies of Marines	— 130	2340	72

## In J E R S E Y and G U E R N S E Y.

4 Companies of Marines	— 130	520	16
------------------------	-------	-----	----

## In A F R I C A.

4 Companies of Marines	— 130	520	16
			Total

An

		Men.	Officers.
Total of the Forces in GREAT BRITAIN and IRELAND		6000	240
Artillery		2400	192
Marines		22100	680
Invalids		3000	120
Marines in AMERICA, and our garrisons abroad		16380	594
Artillery		800	64
	Total	50680	1800

N. B. Non-commissioned officers to the marine corps the same as in the artillery at present, as to number and system.

Number of companies of marines would be nearly 300. To each ten companies should be added a colonel and two majors. A very small staff would be necessary, if any.

IN A FORTRESS IN THE CARRIAGE LANDS

AUGUSTA, 1815. ADAMANT



IN TEXAS, IN NEW JERSEY,

IN ALBANY, IN NEW YORK, IN NEW YORK, IN NEW YORK,

IN A FORTRESS

IN A FORTRESS

1815.